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ABSTRAK 
   Pergerakan simpul dan kurangnya infrastruktur dalam mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) membuatnya sangat rentan 
terhadap berbagai serangan. Selain itu, karena fleksibilitas dan kesederhanaan dari MANET, tidak ada standar waktu atau 
pengaturan izin untuk simpul keluar atau masuk ke dalam jaringan dan setiap node dapat bertindak sebagai klien atau server. 
Pengamanan komunikasi antar simpul pada MANET merupakan salah satu masalah yang menantang jika dibandingkan 
dengan jenis jaringan yang lainnya. Pada MANET, serangan dibuat dalam kategori yang berbeda. Black hole merupakan 
salah satu serangan yang banyak ditangani oleh peneliti dalam beberapa tahun terakhir. Serangan ini terjadi ketika sebuah 
simpul berbahaya yang disebut dengan black hole menjadi bagian dari jaringan dan mencoba untuk menggunakan kebiasaan 
buruknya dengan mengirim Route Reply Packets (RREP) palsu untuk bisa menerima Route Request Packet (RREQ). Ketika 
paket palsu sampai di simpul sumber, simpul sumber akan membalasnya dengan mengirimkan paket data melalui jalur yang 
telah ditetapkan. Ketika paket sampai di black hole maka akan dibuang sebelum sampai ke simpul tujuan. Dalam makalah ini, 
kami menyajikan ikhtisar dari berbagai teknik atau metode yang disarankan dalam literatur untuk mendeteksi dan mencegah 
serangan black hole dalam mobile ad-hoc network. Di samping itu juga menyajikan pengaruh masing–masing pendekatan 
pada kinerja jaringan. 
    
Kata Kunci: — Ad-hoc, Malicious node, MANET, Mobile node, RREQ, RREP, Serangan black hole.  
 
ABSTRACT 
The infrastructure-less nature and mobility of nodes in mobile ad-hoc network (MANET) make it to be very susceptible to 
various attacks. Besides, owing to its flexibility and simplicity, there is no predefined time or permission set for nodes to leave 
or join the network and each node can act as a client or server.  Nevertheless, securing communication between nodes has 
become a challenging problem than in the other types of network. Attacks in MANET range into different categories. Black 
hole attack is one of the attacks that has been addressed by many researchers in the recent years. It does occur when a harmful 
mobile node called black hole becomes a part of the network and tries to use its malicious behaviors by sending fake route 
reply packets (RREP) for any received route request packets (RREQ). When these faked packets arrive to the source node, it 
does reply to them by sending data packet via the established route. Once the packets are received by the black hole node, it 
drops them before reaching the destination.  Hence, preventing the source node from reaching the intended destination. In this 
paper, we present an overview of a wide range of techniques suggested in the literature for detecting and preventing black 
hole attacks in mobile ad-hoc network. Additionally, the effect of each approach on the network performance is also presented. 
  
Keywords: — Ad-hoc, Black hole attack, Malicious node, MANET, Mobile node, RREQ, RREP. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
OBILE ad-hoc network (MANET) is type of infrastructure-less network where the location and network 
topology of mobile nodes are dynamically changing [1]. The frequent movement of nodes makes 
MANET to be a complex distributed system comprises of thousands of mobiles nodes that communicate 
through wireless links. Each node has the capability to act as router throughout the communication in the network. 
Since there is no restriction for node to change its location, nodes are more susceptible to many attacks making the 
security in MANET to be the utmost matter of concern [2]. Routing protocols in MANET are highly prone to 
security vulnerabilities.  A single node or a group of mobiles nodes can be simultaneously compromised. Therein, 
detecting such malicious behaviors may be even difficult. New network packets can be generated by the compro-
mised nodes and use them to broadcast non-existing links which results in providing incorrect links and flooding 
other nodes with routing traffic. For some reasons, MANET has got success over a fixed network infrastructure. 
That is, communication in a fixed wired infrastructure does depend upon the wired backbone Infrastructure and 
fixed based stations deployed in data centers or elsewhere around the globe. In some cases, setting up such kind of 
network may be even impossible owing to several reasons such as cost [3][4]. Additionally, factors like radio 
shadows and natural disasters can make the wired network to be unavailable. Therefore, MANET is widely pre-
ferred for various situations such military service, disaster management, rescue operation recovery, hazardous area 
communication, emergency operations, etc. In military, it allows communication links between soldiers on the 
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battlefield to be established [5]. In rescue areas, it enables a new network to be easily set up in case the existing 
network infrastructure has been collapsed or destroyed due to disasters such as earthquake or volcanic eruption, so 
as to get people out of danger.  
In addition, this type of network is highly appropriate and preferable in areas where it is awkward to establish a 
fixed network infrastructure. As the communication between nodes occurs without any fixed infrastructure, the 
nodes’ connectivity is achieved by forwarding network packets across themselves. This connectivity is enhanced 
by employing some widely adopted routing protocols like “Dynamic Source Routing (DSR), Ad-hoc On-Demand 
Distance Vector (AODV) and Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV)” in each node. Nevertheless, the 
lack of infrastructure has stimulated snoopers to launch several attacks trying to comprise the security. Black hole 
attack is one of the attacks encountered in mobile ad hoc network. It occurs when all packets being forwarded to 
other nodes get absorbed by a malicious node in itself, exactly like a hole which is sucking everything in or some-
body sucking a lemonade through a straw. All packets are dropped by malicious node (s). Hence, it results in a 
route discovery vulnerability preventing packets from reaching the destination.  
Similar to any type of communication, the sender (also known as the transmitter) always wishes to transmit data 
as fast as possible and such data must be kept intact during the transmission [6]. Nonetheless, in MANET, this 
advantage is taken by attackers who claim to be nearby the destination and start advertising fake shortest path. 
Besides, due to the limited mobile nodes’ battery power, nodes are kept awake till their batteries get down and turn 
to permanent sleep [7]. Preventing nodes’ network resources form being misused is one of the main goals for 
protecting multi-hope networks. Any effective security architecture should adhere to the requirements such as 
“confidentiality, integrity, availability, authentication, and non-repudiation” [8]. 
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows. A quick learn through of protocols in MANET is given 
in section II, Section III discusses black hole attacks, various detection and prevention techniques are presented in 
section IV, Section V provides a recap on the overall effect of each technique with respect to the network perfor-
mance. Finally, conclusion and the future are provided in the last section. 
II. PROTOCOLS IN MANET 
In MANET, if Mobile nodes fall in the same wireless range, they can communicate directly. On the contrary, if 
the range is different, in order to transfer messages cooperation from other nodes becomes a requirement. Nodes 
can act as routers or hosts throughout the network. Acting as a router means that they have to control and manage 
the routing paths which necessitate a routing protocol. Minimizing control overhead, energy consumption and 
packets loss ratio are the main objectives of routing protocols in MANET. As protocols may be used in different 
situations, this makes their necessity and complexity to be also different. Basically, considering routing discovery,  
protocols fall into three groups [9]. 
 
1) On-Demand or Source-initiated protocols: In this category of routing protocols, routing is performed only 
when it is necessary. That is, the route discovery process is invoked whenever there is a packet to be sent from 
source to destination. The route is maintained active until the message reaches the destination. In other words, 
the route terminates when the communication is no longer needed. DSR and AODV are the examples of pro-
tocols in this category. 
2) Proactive or Table-driven protocols: In contrast to source-initiated protocols, in proactive more than one tables 
having routing information to every other node have to be maintained by each node. To make sure that the 
latest updates of the network are maintained, each node keeps on updating its routing table. DSDV is amongst. 
3) Hybrid routing protocols: Provides a core features from source initiated and table driven protocols. As two 
categories of protocols recombined, there is a performance enhancement. ZRP is of the routing protocol 
adopted in this category. 
III. BLACK HOLE ATTACK 
   One of the denial of service (DOS) attacks in MANET is known as black hole attack [10]. The attack can be 
launched from the internal or external malicious nodes. In this attack, fake RREP packets are sent by a malicious 
node (black hole node) to the source node where the route discovery originates from pretending itself to be an 
intermediate node to the destination or the actual destination node. In this way, data packets would be sent by the 
source node to the black hole node. As a result, all packets will be absorbed and dropped by the malicious node 
which will further prevent them from reaching the destination. That is, the source node will no longer be able to 
communicate with the destination node. It is also worth to mention that malicious node can also forward the sniffed 
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packets to the wrong address. A well labelled diagram illustrating the black hole attack scenario is depicted in Fig. 
1 [11]. 
 
   In Fig. 1, M is used to denote the malicious node absorbing and dropping all packets from source node (S) pre-
venting them from reaching the destination node (D). Furthermore, two categories of black hole attacks namely, 
single black hole attack and cooperative black hole attack are elucidated below. 
A. Single black hole attack 
   During a single black hole attack, a single harmful node claims to have the shortest and freshest route to the 
destination by advertising itself. This node always replies to the route request, absorbs and drops data packets from 
the source node [12]. The scenario can be seen in Fig. 2 [13]. 
Having the scenario illustrated in Fig. 2, let us now delve on what is exactly happening. First, RREQ packet is 
broadcasted from node 1 targeting to reach the destination (node 4). Generally, in a normal routing operation, in 
order to find the possible shortest route to node 4, the RREQ will be rebroadcasted by all neighboring nodes towards 
node 4. Nevertheless, a malicious node (black hole node) interferes the communication by disobeying the normal 
routing protocols and transmits RREP packet to node 1 claiming to have the shortest path (also called route) and 
the highest sequence number to node 4 before any other RREP from normal nodes reaches node 1. Since B’s 
harmful intentions are unknown to 1, the node 1 will start sending data packets to node B, which further absorbs 
and drops all packets without forwarding them to the destination (node 4).                                                                                                                                                                        
B. Cooperative black hole attack 
   When more than one single malicious nodes cooperate having the intention to create a black hole attack, the 
resulting attack is known as cooperative (collaborative) black hole attack. Schematically, Fig. 3 depicts the entire 
scenario [13]. 
The example illustrated in Fig. 3 shows the node 1 trying to transmit data to node 4 and two malevolent nodes 
B1 and B2 working cooperatively. Taking into account the routing procedure of a protocol that does detect a single 
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black hole node, the existence of B1 will be first checked by node 1 through another route such as node 2. Never-
theless, a positive reply will be forwarded to node 2 by B2 since it is cooperating with node B1. Therefore, data 
will be sent from node 1 to B1 expecting that the route is secure, thereafter, B2 will absorb and drop all packets 
before being delivered to node 4. 
IV. DETECTION AND PREVENTION TECHNIQUES 
This section elaborates some of the current techniques for detecting and preventing black hole attacks in 
MANET. 
A. Nodes’ Reliability checking scheme 
In 2013, G. Wahane and S. Lonare [14] suggested a technique for detecting cooperative black hole attack. Over-
all, their technique works as follows. Two concepts for modifying the existing AODV protocol were first intro-
duced. That is, nodes’ reliability checking and maintaining information in the routing table. Three bits of infor-
mation where two-bits are sent by the nodes that reply to the source node with RREP and one bit of information 
broadcasted by any mobile node in the network are maintained by every node. The bit 1 is utilized to indicate true 
while the bit 0 indicates false in the routing table. Besides, nodes’ reliability checking is used to check the status 
of the node whether being trustful or un-trustful based on the next-hoping information available in the routing table, 
thereafter nodes can be marked as black hole attack or not. Different cases were triggered to examine and identify 
cooperative black hole nodes in the network. 
B. Trusted AODV 
   The work in [15] introduced a new approach that utilizes the trust function to deal  with collaborative black hole 
attacks.  The trusted routing behavior is mainly performed based on the trust relationship that exists between nodes. 
Therein, it is possible to detect and deny any node intending to perform malicious activities throughout the entire 
network. By considering the defined threshold and the trust on neighbor values, nodes were grouped into three 
different categories, specifically “unreliable, reliable and most reliable” nodes.  Any node having a minimum trust 
level is said to be unreliable. Typically, when a node joins a network in MANET, its trust relationship level to all 
its neighboring nodes is relatively low, they treat it as non-trusted node. Reliable node means that its neighbors has 
received some packets through it.  
  The reliable node falls between the first and the last category. For Most reliable nodes, the trust level is high. High 
trust level means that many packets were sent and received successfully by its neighbors through it. The trust value 
is calculated for each node with respect to its neighbors during the route discovery process. Each node has to 
maintain a trust table in order to detect any malevolent mobile node. The route going to the most reliable node is 
always preferred over the one going to reliable node. If it occurs that there is no most reliable node present in the 
network, the priority is given to reliable node but unreliable node will never be considered to establish route. Re-
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Fig. 3. Cooperative Black hole attack [13] 
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garding the threshold value, to distinguish from the nodes’ category mentioned above, different values were de-
fined. That is, a function for estimating the trust value was further suggested. Before transferring data packet, the 
source node has to check the trust status table to find the suitable and secure route based on the status value and the 
threshold value. To evaluate the effectiveness of their algorithm, fake packets were sent and all parameters were 
calculated to identify the status of any nodes. 
C. An approach based on Data Routing Information (DRI) table 
    By using the approach presented by Dorri and Nikdel [16], black holes nodes can be eliminated in the entire 
network. Each node in the network has to keep information about its neighbors in so called a “data routing infor-
mation (DRI)” table. To develop the proposed approach, Table I was utilized. 
Based on Table I, three main columns are identified, “Node, From, and Through” respectively. The first column 
is used to indicate the ID of the neighboring node while the remaining columns are used to determine if the node 
has communicated with the specific node or not. To indicate if data packets from a node that is in “node #” have 
been received or not by a node, “From” is used while “Through” shows if packets were sent or not by node via a 
specific node (node in Node column). The proposed algorithm is mainly divided into the following stages. 
a) Stage 1: Discovering the freshest path  
   This stage is employed to discover the best path based on the routing algorithm. Usually, in AODV protocol 
RREQ packets are first broadcasted whenever a node needs to transfer data to the destination. If a malicious node 
in the network receives the RREQ packet, it directly creates a RREP having a high sequence number intending to 
be trusted by the source node as having the best route. This will stimulate the source node to send all data packets 
to the malicious node. To address this serious problem, the DRI, next and the previous hope’s information are 
included in each RREP after that they are sent to the source node. 
b) Stage 2: Path checking  
   The path which is secure is generated at this stage. The details about the process can be seen in Fig. 4. 
c) Stage 3: Malicious node elimination 
   The objective of this stage is to eliminate all malicious nodes detected on the network. In case a malicious node 
is detected by the source node, the source creates a packet and the ID of the detected node is appended to the packet 
which is then broadcasted to the neighboring nodes throughout the network. With this scheme, for any black hole 
node detected, its information is recorded in the last two columns from Table I as “NULL”, hence, no further 
information will be added by the malevolent nodes in the network. 
D. IDS Based Method  
   In 2011, Su  [17] presented an intrusion detection approach for detecting and preventing malicious selective black 
hole attack in the network. Any node pretending to act as a black hole attack or alternatively as normal is known 
as a selective black hole attack. In this approach, every node has to execute a mechanism called “Anti-Black Hole 
Mechanism”. By utilizing this mechanism, the node’s suspicious value can be estimated based on the abnormal 
behaviors from both RREQ and RREP. A message has to be broadcasted by the closet IDS whenever the suspicious 
value surpasses the defined threshold. That is, a notification message will be sent to all nodes in order to collabo-
ratively exclude the detected malicious nodes from the network. The broadcasted message has three fields, the IDS 
that generates the message, the detected black hole node and the identification time.   
   After being notified, malicious node will be put to black list. To achieve this, some assumptions were made 
throughout their experiment. First, Intrusion detection nodes have to be close to each other but in a transition range 
to allow notification messages to be forwarded between them. Second, all nodes are authenticated to the IDS in 
order to prevent forging nodes as well as the broadcasted message from being altered or falsified. Third, all network 
traffic is sniffed by the IDS. Additionally, messages are broadcasted to all nodes in the transition range and to keep 
track of the malicious nodes, a block table was added to the existing routing table. So, whenever a black hole node 
TABLE I 
DATA ROUTING INFORMATION [16] 
Node # Data Routing Information 
 From Through 
4 0 0 
2 1 0 
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is identified, it has to be recorded in the block table. The illustration of the proposed IDS nodes’ transition range 
architecture can be found in  [17]. 
E. An authenticated end-to-end based approach 
   An approach that deals with simple and cooperative attacks based on end-to-end authentication and acknowledg-
ment was further proposed in 2014, by Baadache and Belmehdi [18]. Since bidirectional packet exchange is re-
quired for the proposed solution, wireless links were assumed to be bidirectional. Assuming that M, P, and L are 
nodes with one node being the successor of the other and having a message (msg) to be transferred from M to L 
through P. the following points were taken into consideration in order to ensure the effectiveness of the suggested 
solution. 
 
1. L must generate an acknowledgment confirming that the message has been received  
2. P is prevented from sending messages to M trying to impersonate L 
3. P cannot alter messages passing via it  
4. The attack cannot be led by two nodes that tries to cooperate in end-to-end path  
 
   To develop the proposed solution, M and L have to share a common key. All messages being shared between M 
and L via P are encrypted and decrypted using the key. That is, any message from M going to L via P is first 
encrypted using the key, thereafter it gets decrypted by C using the common shared key. Besides, a hash function 
was also utilized to maintain the integrity of messages that pass via a malicious node. According to their experi-
mental results, this approach is able to detect black hole attacks launched in both simple and cooperative way. 
However, the traffic overhead is slightly generated throughout the network. 
  Algorithm 1: Steps in checking Path [16] 
1 1 Set RREP generate as intermediate Node (IN) 
2 Connect to the IN's NHN 
3 Ask for its NHN in the path and DRI entries for NHN and IN 
4 Check IN if IN is malicious 
5 { 
6 Mark IN as a black hole node 
7 Go to 19 
8 } 
9 If NHN is trusted or is in the destination 
10 { 
11 Update DRI table 
12 Go to 19 
13 } 
14 Else 
15 { 
16 Set NHN as IN 
17 Got to 2 
18 } 
19 Set RREP generator as intermediate node (IN) 
20 Connect to the IN 's PHN 
21 Ask for its PHN  in the path and DRI entries 
22 for PHN and IN 
23 { 
24 Got to 34 
25 } 
26 Else 
 
 
27 { 
28 Check if IN  is a malicious node 
29 } 
30 Mark IN as black hole node 
31 Go to 43 
32 } 
33 } 
34 if PHN is trustable or the source 
35 { 
36 Go to 43 
37 } 
38 Else 
39 { 
40 Set PHN as IN 
41 Go to 19 
42 } 
43 If node marked ad malicious 
44 { 
45 Path is safe. Send data packets 
46 } 
47 Else 
48 { 
49 Aware network of malicious node's ID 
50 Set Null as DRI entries for malicious 
node 
51 Find new path 
52 } 
Fig. 4. Path Checking Algorithm [16] 
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F. A dynamic threshold cumulative sum mechanism 
   To analyze, quantify and detect black hole attacks, in 2016, Panos et al. [19] implemented a novel black hole 
detection approach that utilizes a “dynamic threshold cumulative sum (CUSUM)” to check the abnormal changes 
in the normal behavior of the sequence numbers (SQNs) that occurs due to the presence of black hole nodes in the 
network. In contrast to the other schemes that detect nodes behaving maliciously after discovering unexpected 
packet drop, this mechanism can highly identify malicious nodes during the first step of the attack. That is, with 
this approach the intention and the ability of a malicious node to absorb and drop packet is limited. An instance of 
a detection mechanism that does depend on the audit data is executed by each node in the network. Notice that 
nodes do not cooperate during the execution of this mechanism. The detection is done by evaluating the SQNs 
statistical distribution before and after changing. Each time the unlikeness between the two surpasses some prede-
fined threshold, an alarm is directly triggered. The CUSUM value of the threshold can be static or dynamic. During 
the first phase the CUSUM needs to be trained in order to recognize malicious behavior. Generally, the details 
about their proposed algorithm including notations can be viewed in [19]. 
G. Hint Based   Probabilistic Approach 
   The algorithm which is able to identify black hole attacks using probabilistic routing strategy was presented in 
[20]. In this approach, since nodes can join the transition range at different time intervals, the joining time of each 
node was considered. Additionally, as nodes may move frequently in the network, this can interrupt the connection, 
which can cause some communication link breakage. For the sake of discovering nodes’ misbehavior, this breakage 
time was also considered. The operation of this approach can be summed up as follows. It starts by computing the 
hint value for all sender’s neighboring nodes. The Hint value is obtained by subtracting the joining time and the 
time for connection breakage for each particular node. This value is then compared with the threshold. If the hint 
value is less or equals to the threshold, the status of the node is recorded as “black hole node” otherwise the node’s 
status is set to” fair node”. After detecting each node’s status, packet will only be transferred to the “fair nodes” 
while black hole nodes will be discarded from receiving any data packet. 
H. Trusted Value AODV Based Scheme 
   The Authors in [21] introduced the scheme that uses trusted value to discover the best route. That is, with this 
scheme instead of sending packets via the shortest path, packets are sent via paths that are trusted. Apart from the 
“trust value”, other parameters such as weight factor and threshold value are taken into consideration. This trusted 
value is calculated based on each node’s ability to transfer packets as well as its potential to forward RRQ.  All 
packets transferred or received by each node are reordered in order to be used for computing its ability. According 
to their experimental results, with this approach malicious nodes can be detected and the number packets that are 
dropped is also considerably decreased. Besides, further information can be found in [21]. 
TABLE II 
 COMPARISON BETWEEN BLACK HOLE DETECTION TECHNIQUES 
Methods  Simulator Protocol  Type of detection Experimental results 
Nodes’ reliability checking 
scheme [14] 
 
NS-2 
 
AODV 
Cooperative attack detection It reduces the end-to-end delay and over-
head  
Trusted hyperbolic[15] NS-2 AODV Collaborative attacks detection The approach enhances the throughput   
DRI based approach [16] NS-2 AODV Collaborative attacks detection  Processing time and packet overhead are 
minimized  
IDS based method [17] NS-2 AODV and 
MAODV 
Selective and collaborative at-
tacks detection 
The packet loss ratio is improved 
 
An authenticated end-to-end based 
approach [18] 
 
OPNET 
Modeler 
11.5 
 
 
AODV and 
OLSR 
 
Single and cooperative attacks 
detection  
This model achieves good packet delivery 
ratio for both Protocols. Nonetheless, a 
traffic overhead is slightly generated 
throughout the network. 
 
A novel black hole detection 
mechanism, CUSUM [19] 
 
NS-2 
 
AODV 
 
Single attack detection 
Black hole nodes can be detected with a 
minimal delay and low false positive rate. 
Besides, it achieves a high detection accu-
racy and reduces network overhead 
Hint based probabilistic 
routing approach [20] 
NS-2 AODV Single attack detection The algorithm can decrease the number of 
dropped packets 
Trusted value AODV scheme [21] OMNeT++ AODV Single attack detection Number of dropped packets is considera-
bly decreased  
 
Enhanced modified AODV [22] 
 
NS2-2 
 
AODV 
 
Single and Collaborative attacks 
detection 
This model achieves a high packet delivery 
ratio. However, it does require more time 
to identify the malevolent nodes. 
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I. Enhanced Modified AODV 
   Another technique that prevents collaborative black hole can be found on the work presented by Rana et al. [22] 
in 2015. The enhancement was done by extending the functionality of the normal AODV protocol. Two additional 
control packet types are added to the route discovery. From the source node, SRRD_REQ is used while for the 
destination, SRRD_REP is created. Both Packets control are only kept by the source node and the destination node. 
Furthermore, the routing table is changed by adding two parameters namely, the “threshold value and the reliability 
list (RL)”. All information about nodes that are trusted is kept in RL while all destination sequence number’s 
average of the reliable nodes is maintained in the threshold field. Based on their experiment, attacks can be detected 
and prevented throughout the network. The brief overview about all techniques presented in this survey can be 
viewed in Table II.  
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
   The security vulnerability of mobile nodes in MANET has stimulated many researchers to develop various meth-
ods for detecting and preventing black hole attack. Black hole attack is among severe attacks in MANET whereby 
a malicious node absorbs and drops all data packets from the source node preventing them to be delivered to the 
destination. The attack can be initiated by a single node or several nodes that work collaboratively to drop data 
packets and flood other nodes throughout the network.  In this paper, routing protocols in Mobile ad hoc network 
are introduced. Additionally, a comprehensive survey on some of the existing techniques available the literature 
aiming at detecting and preventing black hole attack is given. In addition, the effect of these techniques on the 
network performance is also analyzed.  By employing these methods, single and cooperative black hole attacks can 
be detected and prevented in the network. Nevertheless, as it can be seen in Table II, some techniques achieve good 
detection while decreasing the network performance. Accordingly, we believe that the work presented in this paper 
will help researchers to easily realize the current status on black hole attack detection techniques. Last but not least, 
since the security in MANET is still a matter of concern, in our future work we intend to extend this study to various 
attacks being encountered in MANET. 
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